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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
lower court is contained in the caption of the case upon appeal,
with the exception of Summit County.
nally a defendant.

Summit County was origi-

The Complaint against Summit County was vol-

untarily dismissed by the plaintiff prior to trial.
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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from findings of fact and conclusions
of law and a final judgment entered following trial in the Third
Judicial District Court of Summit County.

Jurisdiction is pre-

mised upon Utah Const. , Art. VIII, $ 3; Utah Code Ann, S 78-2-2
(1953); and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the lower court erred in denying to plaintiff
Shirley Gillmor a private easement of access across the property
of defendants to her own property for persons who had purchased
permits to hunt big game there, and whether plaintiff is entitled
to injunctive relief and damages.
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION
There

is no constitutional provision or

legislation

believed to be determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed by Stephen Gillmor against the
Wright defendants to establish a private easement of access for
big game hunters on a road from Interstate 80 in Echo Canyon,
across property owned by the Wrights, to property owned and
-1-

leased by Stephen Gillmor at the head of Sawmill Canyon, Summit
County,

Utah.

plaintiff's

motion

interference
Plaintiff's
Wilkinson

In

by

for

was

with

Judge

plaintiff's
In

and

order
use

motion

Edward

enjoin

the

road.

1987,

Judge

for

Leslie

heard

to

of

September,

plaintiff's

Gillmor

Billings

restraining

denied.

and denied

Charles

1986,

temporary

defendants

motion

heard

injunction.

September,

preliminary

Gillmor

then

intervened as defendants in the litigation and, in their counterclaims alleged, among other things, a right to reform a decree of
partition entered by the Third District Court in 1981 which partitioned

the Sawmill

Canyon property

and other property

among

Charles Gillmor, Edward Leslie Gillmor and Florence Gillmor, the
last

being

Stephen

Gillmor1s predecessor-in-interest.

Stephen

Gillmor passed away and was succeeded as plaintiff by his wife,
Shirley Gillmor.
both

the

issue

The matter went to trial in September, 1988, on
of

the

private

easement

of

access

originally

raised by Stephen Gillmor, and on the issue of reformation of the
partition decree.

Judge Murphy entered findings of fact and con-

clusions of law and a judgment dismissing both Shirley Gillmor's
complaint

and the counterclaim of Edward Leslie and Charles F.

Gillmor.

This appeal is from Judge Murphy's dismissal of Shirley

Gillmor's

complaint.

plaintiff

t~*es

The

exception

findings
are

-2-

and

Finding

conclusions
of

Fact

No.

to
17

which
and

Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 8.

(Addendum "C".)

The

defendants and intervenor-defendants have filed cross-appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This lawsuit concerns real property owned by the parties around Sawmill Canyon, Summit County, Utah.
is east of Echo, Utah on Interstate 80.

Sawmill Canyon

The canyon contains an

unimproved, dirt road which leaves the 1-80 frontage road and
runs north, first crossing

the property owned by the Wright

defendants and then entering the property owned by the Gillmor
parties.

(See Map, Addendum "A".)
Prior to 1982, the Gillmor Sawmill property, together

with property

elsewhere

Gillmor, Edward

Leslie

in the state, was owned by Florence
"Bud" Gillmor

Gillmor as tenants in common.

and Charles

F. "Frank"

In 1982, the Third District Court

of Salt Lake County entered an order which partitioned all of the
Gillmor property, including the Sawmill property.
Fact No. 7.)

(Finding of

The southern quarter of the Sawmill property was

awarded to Frank Gillmor.
awarded to Bud Gillmor.

The next quarter to the north was

The upper one-half of the property was

awarded to Florence Gillmor.

(See Map and Partition Decree,

Exhibits IP and 2P.)
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11 i e m

to

I i u n t o i i 11 i e S a wm ill

property, and did not use the Sawmill road for access for such
persons.

(Finding of Fact No. 10.)
The

Sawmill

Canyon

Road

has

historically

carried

a

variety of vehicles, including trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles, and has been travelled by persons
in vehicles, on foot and on horseback.

(Id.)

In 1982, Stephen Gillmor, as the lessee of the property
of Florence Gillmor and Frank Gillmor, began to sell permits to
individuals to hunt on the Florence and Frank Gillmor property in
Sawmill Canyon.

(Tr. 9/25/87, p. 32;

Finding of Fact No. 11.)

At the same time, defendant Dennis Wright first informed Stephen
Gillmor and his permitted hunters that they could not cross the
Wright

property

on

the

Sawmill

road

Gillmor Sawmill property for hunting.

to obtain

access

to

the

(Id.; Finding of Fact No.

12.)
In the fall of 1986, Stephen Gillmor filed this action
against
his

use

the Wright defendants to enjoin their interference with
of

the

Sawmill

road

as access

for hunters.

Shortly

thereafter, a hearing was held on plaintifffs application for a

1

References to transcripts will be as follows: the hearing
on plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order will be
"Tr. 9/30/86"; the hearing on plaintiffs motion for preliminary
injunction will be "Tr. 9/25/87"; the hearing on plaintiff's
motion to amend judgment will be "Tr. 9/30/87"; and the trial
will be "Tr. 9/20/88".
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No
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Olsen
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immediately
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- Commis-

In the fall of 1987, Stephen Gillmor moved for a preliminary
road.

injunction

to halt

interference

with

his

use

of

the

A one-day evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Homer

Wilkinson on September 25, 1987.

At the conclusion of the hear-

ing, Judge Wilkinson ruled that plaintiff had a right to use the
Sawmill

Canyon Road

for any purpose

for which

it was

lawfully

used prior to its abandonment by Summit County in December, 1986.
(Tr. 9/25/87, p. 252.)

The judge ruled that such legal use did

not include hunting by permittees because that practice violated
the Summit County zoning ordinance.

(Tr. 9/25/87, p. 253.)

The

court's decision was based upon (Tr. 9/30/87, p. 53) the testimony of Jerry Smith, Director of the Summit County Planning and
Building Department (Tr. 9/25/87, p. 190, et seq.), who testified
about

the

zoning

implications

of

a cabin

Stephen

Gillmor

had

built on his property in 1987, (Id. at p. 196) after the County's
abandonment of the road.

(Tr. 9/25/87, p. 45.)

The matter was tried to the court, Judge Michael Murphy
presiding, on September 20 and 21, 1988.

Judge Murphy issued a

written opinion entitled "Summary Decision" in which he indicated
that he agreed with plaintiff's position, but that he felt constrained to abide by the opinion of Judge Wilkinson in deference
to the law of the case doctrine.
Judge

Murphy

did

find,

however,
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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL DECLARATION THAT SHE IS THE OWNER OF A PRIVATE
EASEMENT ACROSS THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD AS A
MEANS OF ACCESS TO THE GILLMOR
SAWMILL
PROPERTY.

A.
A Landowner Whose Property Abuts a Public Road
Possesses, by Operation of Lawf a Private Easement of Access to
and From Her Property Across the Road, Which Survives Any Abandonment of the Public Riqht-of-Way.
The trial court found, and defendants do not dispute,
that plaintiff

is a property owner whose property adjoined the

Sawmill

Road

Canyon

continues

to

own

the

when

it was

property

a public

since

the

road,
road

and

was

who

now

abandoned.

(Findings of Fact No. 1, 5, 9, 14.)
Under

Utah

law,

as well

as

under

the

law

of

other

jurisdictions, a landowner whose property abuts a public

road,

possesses, by operation of law, a private easement of access to
his property across the public road.

See, e.g., Mason v. State,

656 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1982); Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v.
State,

Road Commission,

533 P.2d

882, 883

(Utah

1975);

accord

Lower Payette Ditch Co. v. Smith, 254 P.2d 417, 420 (Idaho 1953).
A subsequent

abandonment of the public right-of-way over such a

road has no effect on the private easement owned by an abutting
landowner.

See Mason, supra, 656 P.2d at 468-69; Hague v. Juab

-9-

County Mill & Elevator Co,, 107 P. 249, 252 (Utah 1910); see also
Utah Code Ann. S 27-12-102.5 (1953 Repl. Vol. 1984 Ed.).
The Mason case appears to be the Utah Supreme Court's
most

recent

landowner's

pronouncement

on

the

subject

of

an

abutting

right of access over an abandoned public road.

In

Mason, the plaintiff had conveyed to the State in 1951 by warranty deed

a strip of

owned by plaintiff.

land which

ran through a larger parcel

Thereafter, a highway was constructed across

the strip owned by the State,

In 1976, after a new freeway was

constructed

abandoned

nearby,

the

State

the

old

highway,

and

informed the plaintiff that if he did not buy the strip of land
for $3,675, it would be sold to a third person.
paid the sum to the State under protest.
same

time,

the

State

tore

up

and

The plaintiff

At approximately the

destroyed

portions

of

the

abandoned highway.
Plaintiff subsequently commenced an action against the
State

seeking,

restore

the

impaired,

inter

portions

alia,
of

a judgment

the

abandoned

highway

the State to
that

had

been

torn up, or blocked, on the basis of the plaintiff's

right of access as an abutting
trial

requiring

court's

dismissal

of

landowner.

the

plaintiff's

On appeal
claims,

Supreme Court reversed, stating as follows:
Except where changed by statutes pertaining to limited access highways, . . . an
abutting landowner has a private easement of
-10-

from the
the

Utah

ingress
and
highways.

egress

to

existing

public

This private easement of access has been
held to survive the abandonment or vacation
of the public highway.
656 P.2d at 468 (citations omitted).

Similarly, in the present

case, plaintiff, as the owner of property abutting
Canyon

Road,

has

which

survives

a private
Summit

easement

County's

of

the Sawmill

access over

abandonment

of

the
the

road,
pubic

right-of-way over the road.
Plaint ifffs Easement of Access Permits Access by

B.
Hunters.
Judge

Wilkinson

ruled

on

plaintiff's

motion

for

a

preliminary injunction that any lawful use of the Sawmill Canyon
Road up to the time of its abandonment
appropriate

use.

plaintiff's

use of

Judge

Wilkinson

the property

in December, 1986 was an

then

went

for hunting

on

to

rule

that

was not

a lawful
2
activity because it violated the Summit County zoning ordinance
and, therefore, use of the road for that purpose could not be
considered

for purposes of establishing

the permissible use of

2
Plaintiff disagrees with the lower court's ruling that hunting, as conducted by Stephen Gillmor on the property prior to
December, 1986, violated applicable zoning laws. Because use of
the road after abandonment is determined by use of the road prior
to abandonment, and not use of the property, plaintiff will not
include in this brief argument on the interpretation of the zoning ordinance.
-11-

the

road

after

abandonment,

(Tr.

9/25/87,

p.

253.)

Judge

Wilkinson was in error in his holding, basing it upon a misapplication of the Utah Supreme Court's decisions

in Hague v. Juab

County Mill & Elevator Co., 107 P. 249 (Utah 1910) and Mason v.
State, supra.
Judge Michael Murphy

disagreed

with Judge Wilkinson.

Judge Murphy said, in his Summary Decision (Addendum " B " ) :
It is clear that Judge Wilkinson's
interpretation and application of Hague v.
Juab County Mill & Elevator Co., 107 P. 249
(Utah 1910) and Mason v. State. 656 P.2d 465
(Utah 1982) differs with the views heretofore
expressed in this Summary Decision.
Judge
Wilkinson's views also suggest
that the
purposes for which access is sought determine
whether access is to be allowed.
(P.I. tr.,
p. 253, In. 13-15, 22-24).
This Summary
Decision, however, indicates that a destination purpose does not taint one's use of an
easement or right-of-way as long as that use
is not a different or greater burden on the
servient estate.
The law of the case doctrine,
however,
dictates
that
Judge
Wilkinson's interpretations and application
prevail.
(Summary Decision at p. 7.)
Judge
reasons.

Wilkinson's

First,

his

decision

decision

that

was

in error

hunting,

as

for

several

conducted

by

Stephen Gillmor, constituted an illegal use of the property was
based upon testimony surrounding the construction of a cabin by
Mr. Gillmor.

The line of questioning

that concerned the issue

was directed to Jerry Smith, the Director of the Summit County
-12-

Planning and Building Department, who was asked about a building
permit Mr. Gillmor had obtained when he constructed
(See Tr. 9/25/87, pp. 191-195.)
until

1987.

December,

The county

1986.

prior to its abandonment.
are immaterial.

The cabin was not constructed

abandoned

The correct

the cabin.

the Sawmill

Canyon

Road

in

inquiry is to the use of the road

Events occurring after the abandonment

Judge Wilkinson himself recognized the error in

the hearing on plaintiff's motion to amend judgment when he said,
"I do think [plaintiff's] argument

is well taken when he argues

that what happened after December 26th of '86 is irrelevant and
the building of the house and the—and so forth on there."

(Tr.

9/30/87, p. 55.)
Additionally, Judge Wilkinson's decision was based upon
a misunderstanding of the Hague and Mason opinions.
do not

stand

property

for the proposition

Those cases

that the use of the abutting

is pertinent to the use of the road after abandonment,

and they do not support Judge Wilkinson's conclusion that unlawful activities on the property render use of the road for access
unlawful

and,

therefore,

impermissible.

In

Mason

v.

State,

supra, discussed above, plaintiff owned a piece of property which
was bisected

by a public highway.

The highway was eventually

abandoned and torn up, and plaintiff sued to obtain, among other
things, a judgment

requiring

the state to restore the highway.

-13-

The

Utah

Supreme

additional

Court

remanded

evidence, but held that

to

the

lower

court

to

take

the abutting property owner

has an easement over the abandoned highway to the extent

it is

necessary for ingress and egress to and from the property.

No

mention whatsoever was made by the court of the reason for which
the property owner might be travelling over the abandoned highway, or of the use to which he would put his property when he
arrived there.
The Mason opinion cited the decision

in Hague v. Juab

County Mill & Elevator Co,, 107 P. 249 (Utah 1910).
plaintiff

owned property which fronted on a public

road was subsequently

abandoned.

In Hague,
road.

Defendant maintained

between plaintiff's property and the road.

The

a ditch

Defendant modified

its ditch so that plaintiff could no longer cross from the street
to his property and plaintiff
ditch

in any way which

sued to enjoin operation of the

interfered with his access.

The lower

court's award of an injunction to plaintiff was upheld.

In the

process, the court explained that the property owner was entitled
to a reasonably convenient passage way from his premises to the
road.

By the same token, said the court, plaintiff

could not

prevent defendant from using the ditch for the purposes for which
it was

constructed

litigation.

and used prior

to the commencement

of the

The extent of defendant's rights to use the ditch,
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however, are not unlimited, said the court.
sides of the ditch were maintained

If the banks and

in the street at a certain

width and height during all of the years that the ditch has been
used by defendant,

it may not, for its own convenience, change

the channel, if such change interferes with the rights of others.
(Id. at p. 251.)
Neither Hague nor Mason considers in any way the use of
the property to determine the use of the road.

Finally, neither

case restricted the use of the road after abandonment to the same
type of use made before abandonment.

That concept was discussed

only in the Hague case and then only with respect to what activities

were

interfere
road.

permissible

by defendant

with plaintiff1s

right of

if

it appeared

access over

the

they

would

abandoned

In short, Hague and Mason establish the law in this state

to be that Shirley Gillmor, in this case, may continue to use the
Sawmill Canyon Road for any purpose whatsoever to obtain access
to her property, including access for hunters.
Even if the use of the road is to be restricted to the
same type of use made prior to abandonment, Shirley Gillmor1s use
is permissible.

The Sawmill Canyon Road has historically been

used to obtain access to the property by persons travelling on
foot,

on

horseback

and

by

a

variety

of

vehicles,

including

trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles.

-15-

(Finding

of

Fact

No.

10;

Tr.

9/25/87,

pp.

29-30,

170-172.)

During the years 1982 through 1986, those persons who travelled
on the Sawmill Canyon Road in order to exercise hunting rights on
the Stephen Gillmor property travelled there primarily by trucks
and recreational vehicles.
p. 44.)

(Finding of Fact No. 11; Tr. 9/25/87,

The trial court specifically found that while there was

minimal evidence of road damage by hunters, there is realistically no difference in the nature of the use of the road itself,
whether the ultimate use of the various parcels is for commercial
hunting, grazing or both.
ally,

the court

found

(Finding of Fact No. 18.)

Addition-

that, while there was also some minimal

evidence that hunters are bothersome at times to ranchers, cattle
and sheep, there was no sufficient showing that hunters1 use of
the road interfered with the abutting owners1 use of, or access
to, their land.

(Finding of Fact No. 19.)

Assuming

the

use

of

the

road

is

not

altered

in a

significant way, there is a good reason why a change in the use
of the property should not preclude use of the road.

If the rule

were

altered

so,

the

use

of

the

property

could

achieve its highest and best use over time.
Shirley

Gillmor

property,

for

example,

never

be

to

With respect to the
Stephen

Gillmor

had

determined that it is possible to supplement his ranching income
with income from the sale of hunting permits through an activity
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that

is

entirely

consistent

with

agricultural

operations

which allowed him to make more complete use of the land.
should

encourage

landowners

to realize

the potential

and

The law
of

their

land, and not to restrict its use unnecessarily,
II.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A PERMANENT
TION AND DAMAGES.

INJUNC-

Beginning in 1982, the Wright defendants prevented the
plaintiff's use of the road for access by hunters.

Those defen-

dants have indicated they intend to continue to prevent plaintiff
from using

the road

174-175.)

Under the circumstances, plaintiff

permanent
defendants

injunction
with

for access by hunters.

enjoining

plaintiff's

any

use

(Tr. 9/25/87, pp.
is entitled

interference

of

the

road

by
for

to a

the Wright
access

by

hunters.
Plaintiff
ference.

is also entitled to damages for past inter-

The evidence was uncontroverted that plaintiff suffered

$10,940.00 in damages in the form of revenues that were lost from
hunters who had made reservations to hunt on the property, and in
fees that had to be paid to an adjoining landowner to temporarily
obtain alternative access to the property.
20; Exhibit 42; Tr. 9/20/88, pp. 9-10.)

(Finding of Fact No.

Plaintiff is entitled to

a judgment for that sum against the Wright defendants.
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CONCLUSION
Shirley Gillmor requests that this Court reverse the
judgment of the lower court and instruct that the lower court
enter judgment in favor of plaintiff declaring that plaintiff
enjoys a private easement of access on the Sawmill Canyon Road
for herself, permittees, invitees and licensees for all purposes,
including access for hunting; that the court issue a permanent
injunction enjoining defendants1

interference with plaintiff's

use of the Sawmill Canyon Road; and that the lower court enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff against the Wright defendants for
money damages in the sum of $10,940.00.
DATED this

day of AJO \Jts*^\*tsf,

1989.

JAMESsjyLEE
JOHN B. WILSON
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Shirley Gillmor
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

TabB

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FLORENCE J. GILLMOR and
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as the
personal representative of the
Estate Of STEPHEN T. GILLMOR,

SUMMARY DECISION
CIVIL NO. 9067

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT,
RONA R. WRIGHT and SUMMIT
COUNTY, a body politic,
Defendants,
vs.
CHARLES F. GILLMOR and
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-Defendants.

Following trial, the court took t-his matter under advisement
and is now prepared to issue its decision.

This Summary Decision

is not a substitute for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
but is intended to provide the parties with an explication of the
reasons for the court's decision.

As a consequence, no attempt

will even be made to recite the history of this and other related

GILLMOR V. WRIGHT

litigation.1

PAGE TWO

SUMMARY DECISION

That history, recounting these parties1 odyssey

from court to court and judge to judge, could compete with the
best known works of Homer in intricacy, length and author's time.
Without even considering the other cases in which most of
these parties have participated, this case alone has consumed
substantial court resources.

The two day trial on September 20

and 21, 1988 was the third annual evidentiary hearing in this
particular litigation.
to

review

the

Following trial, the court was required

transcripts

evidentiary hearings.

and

understand

the

two

previous

Furthermore, the court was obligated to

fully consider and understand the partition litigation which was
tried before Judge Leary in 1977 and again in 1980.

To the

uninitiated, such as this court per Judge Murphy, these tasks
were not insubstantial.

As a consequence, these parties cannot

expect a speedy decision and do not have any right to claim
priority over those members of the public whose causes were
submitted following the trial of this case.2

Moreover, these

parties should be expected to live with and abide by the
^hese and related disputes have been to the Supreme Court
twice, the Court of Appeals once and before district Judges Hall,
Leary, Frederick, Billings, Wilkinson and now Murphy. ^ A further
voyage on appeal of a judgment based on this decision is likely.
2
The court was not pressed to resolve this case so that the
seasonal rights asserted could immediately be exercised.
The
deer and elk hunting season was virtually upon the parties when
the matter was tried. Thus, the earliest time for exercise of
disputed rights is Spring, 1989 when grazing might occur.

PAGE THREE
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decisions and orders of the various courts and judges whose time
they

have liberally

consumed

and whose jurisdiction

they have

freely invoked.
The issues presented for final resolution before this court
at this time are twofold:
1.
Canyon

Is the plaintiff entitled to use the Sawmill
Road

in

furtherance

of

a commercial

hunting

operation on abutting land?
2.
the

Are the intervenor-defendants entitled to use

Sawmill

Canyon

Road

over

plaintifffs

land

for

livestock access to the eastern portion of their own
land?

I

PLAINTIFFS1 USE OF ROAD

Plaintiff seeks to use Sawmill Canyon Road for access to run
a commercial hunting enterprise on its property

Defendants and

intervenor-defendants oppose such use on the grounds that it is
limited to ranching access, would expand the historical use of
the road and interfere with the historical use of the abutting
owners' land.
The record is clear that there was no actual or attempted
commercial

hunting

on the

parcels

in question prior

to 1982.

While there was some minimal evidence of road damage by hunters,
there is realistically no difference in the nature of the use of

GILLMOR V. WRIGHT
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the road itself whether the ultimate use of the various parcels
is for commercial hunting, grazing or both.
minimal

evidence

that

hunters

are

There was also some

bothersome

at

times

to

ranchers, cattle and sheep but there was no sufficient showing
that

hunters1

use

of the road

interfered

with the abutting

owners' use of or access to their land.
Essentially,

defendants'

position

seeks

to

limit

plaintiff's use of abutting land and the access road.
Juab

County Mill

& Elevator Co., 107 P. 249

both

Hague v.

(Utah 1910) is

inapposite and is not authority to limit plaintiff's use of the
road based on what use it intends to put the abutting land.
Hague the new use placed a greater burden on the street.

In

In the

instant case there is no real difference in the use of the road
by hunters or ranchers; only their objectives, once access is
accomplished,

are different.

In the Hague case the increased

burden on the street interfered with the abutting owner's access
to his own land.
evidence

that

In the instant case, there is insufficient

hunters'

use

defendants' use of the road.

of

the

road

interferes

with

Finally, in Hague there was no

objection to what Juab Mill and Electric did on their fee land.
In this case, however, defendants essentially seek to limit the
plaintiff's use of its abutting land once access is accomplished.

GILLMOR V. WRIGHT

Mason

v.

inapposite.
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State,

656

P.2d

465
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(Utah

1982),

is equally

In Mason the Court was concerned with defendant's

interference with reasonable access to plaintiff's abutting land*
There is insufficient evidence before this court, however, to
establish that hunters' use of the road will interfere with
defendants' access to their abutting land.
The applicability of the above factual determinations and
interpretations of law 11 the final decision in this case are
affected

by

earlier

proceedings.

All

proceedings

litigation before this court are an integrated whole.

in

this

The law of

the case doctrine limits a successor judge and renders many of
the rulings of predecessor judges binding upon the parties as
long

as

this

court

retains

jurisdietion,

underpinning of the doctrine is delay avoidance.

The

expressed

The unexpressed

underpinnings are public confidence in the integrity of court
decisions, the proposition that different personifications of the
same court do not affect its interpretations, and the fundamental
precept that ours is a government of laws, not men.

The law of

the case doctrine has particular applicability to district court
proceedings in Summit County where individual calendaring is not
utilized and judges are rotated semiannually.

Consequently, it

is necessary to analyze the decisions of predecessor judges in
this case.
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The law of the case doctrine has little applicability to the
denial of plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
The

TRO

proceedings

substantive law.

did

not

involve

an

interpretation

of

Plaintiff's motion was denied in September,

1986 by Judge Judith Billings for want of irreparable injury.
Plaintiff now seeks damages and a permanent

injunction which

would interdict accrual of further damages.
In the TRO proceedings it was assumed that the extent of all
parties right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road was dictated by
their respective unchallenged prior use.

Following denial of

plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, however, it
was determined and stipulated that the Sawmill Canyon Road had
been adjudicated to be a public road.

Consequently, the Wright

defendants temporarily ceased interfering with plaintiff's use of
the road and undertook to have Summit County abandon the road as
a

public

way.

This

the

County

did

in

December,

1986 and

defendants resumed their interference with plaintiff's use of
Sawmill Canyon Road for hunting access.
The September, 1987 proceedings before Judge Homer Wilkinson
on

plaintiff's

Motion

for

Preliminary

Junction,

while again

considering relief pendente lite, did involve interpretations of
substantive law.

Consequently, this court must now determine

exactly what was decided and the applicability of the law of the
case doctrine to such decision.

Because there appears to have
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been no entry of formal, written Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, resort must be made to the transcripts of the hearing on
plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the hearing on
plaintiff's motion to reconsider findings and conclusions.3
Following

a

one

day

trial

on

plaintiffs'

Motion

for

Preliminary Injunction, Judge Wilkinson ruled that any lawful use
of

Sawmill

Canyon

Road

up to

the

time of

December, 1986 was an appropriate use.

Its abandonment in

Judge Wilkinson further

ruled that plaintiff's proposed use for hunting access following
the

abandonment

lawful use.

was

an

expansion

of

prior use and was not a

(P.I. tr. p.252, In. 16 to p. 253, In. 18; p. 254

In. 1-7; p. 255, In. 14-21).
It

is

clear

that

Judge

Wilkinson's

interpretation

and

application of Hague v. Juab County Mill & Elevator Co. . 107 P.
249

(Utah

differs

1910) and Mason v. State, 656 P 2d 465

with

Decision.

the

heretofore

expressed

in

this

Summary

Judge Wilkinson's views also suggest that the purposes

for which access
allowed.

views

(Utah 1982)

is sought determine whether

access

(P.I. tr., p. 253, In. 13-15, 22-24).

is to be

This Summary

Decision, however, indicates that a destination purpose does not
taint one's use of an easement or. tight of way as long as that
use is not a different or greater burden on the servient estate.
J

In.

These transcripts will be referenced as "P.I. tr. p.
,
M
and "Rule 59 tr., p.
, In.
, " respectively.
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law

of
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the case doctrine, however, dictates

that Judge

Wilkinson's interpretations and application prevail.4
Immediately

following Judge Wilkinson's ruling, plaintiff

filed a motion seeking reconsideration of his ruling in light of
newly proffered evidence.

That new evidence was composed of two

letters from the Summit County Attorney, one to the director of
the Planning Commission, a witness before Judge Wilkinson, and
the other to Stephen Gillmor, whose estate is now the plaintiff.
Judge Wilkinson did not receive the new evidence and refused to
consider the zoning ordinance.
court

ruled

(sic),

that, considering

plaintiff's

ordinances.

use

of

(Rule 59 tr., pp. 52-56).
only
its

activities prior
property

The

to 198 6

violated

zoning

(Rule 59 tr., p. 60, In. 6-20).

At the 1988 hearing the previously rejected letters of the
Summit

County

Attorney,

Exhibits

40

and

41, were

received.

Additionally, the court received Exhibit 39, a March 8, 1988
letter from the Summit County Planning Commission to plaintiff's
counsel determining that a commercial hunting operation was a
permitted

use

on

property

zoned

AG-1,

categorization of plaintiff's abutting land.

which

was

the

Finally, the court

received the Development Code of Summit County, Exhibit 38.

The

'while Judge Wilkinson's ruling is in part couched in the
preliminary injunction lexicon of probability of success, he did
make the referenced rulings of law to which the law of the case
doctrine applies.
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constitute

the

only

significant new liability evidence in plaintiff's case-in-chief
which had not previously been considered by Judges Billings and
Wilkinson.

This court, then, must consider whether such evidence

would change the outcome by establishing that commercial hunting
was a lawful use prior to 1987.5
The letters from the Summit County Attorney, Exhibits 40 and
41, are not particularly helpful.

The Development Code, Exhibit

38, is the most helpful in determining what was allowed under
what conditions in an AG-1 area, such as those abutting the
Sawmill Canyon Road.

Section 12.20 describes authorized uses in

all zones and provides that a particular use is not allowed in
two situations:

(1) the use is not specified in the accompanying

listing; or (2) is specified but indicated by the signal
In the accompanying

fl

."

list, there is no specific reference to

hunting and use Nos. (4), (5)B., (5)C, an (7)D., are the only
categories which could be inclusive of commercial hunting.

Two

of these categories are conditional uses and two are forbidden
uses.

There is no evidence that at any time in or before 1986 a

permit for conditional use was issued to plaintiffs.

Therefore,

it would appear that commercial hunting was not a lawful use
prior to 1987.
b

While Judge Wilkinson premised his ruling on pre-1986 use
(Rule 59 tr., p. 60, In. 6-20), it is clear that he merely
intended to exclude consideration of plaintiff's 1987 conduct of
constructing a cabin.
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Exhibit 39 constitutes a March 8, 1988 recitation of an
interpretation of the Development Code which is contrary to this
court's

interpretation.

Exhibit

39

opines

that

commercial

hunting in the form of sale of permits in an AG-1 is a permitted
use.

Section 12.21(4) of the Development Code, however, suggests

by its use of the word "hereafter" that determinations such as
Exhibit 39 are prospective only.

Such a determination in 1988

would therefore not render lawful an otherwise unlawful pre-1988
use.6

There

support

is, then, no new evidence before the court to

plaintiffs

claim

for

relief.

The

court, however,

readily concedes that little focus was had on the interpretation
of the Development

Code and the determination of the Summit

County Planning Commission in Exhibit 39.
encouraging

the

same, the court would

Consequently, without
entertain

argument on

reconsideration of this portion of the Summary Decision.

II.

INTERVENORS1 GRAZING ACCESS

The Judgment and Decree of Partition purports to be a full
and complete resolution of the relative property rights of the
plaintiffs and intervenors.

In affirming the judgment, the Utah

Supreme Court delineated factors that remain pertinent to this
^Plaintiff has also asserted a damage claim for interference
with access.
Even if the Exhibit 39 determination^ was
retrospective, the court is not certain that damages in addition
to injunctive relief would be appropriate.
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not

sacrosanct
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The Court acknowledged that historical uses are
in partition

ranching activities would

cases and that Edward

in fact be affected and curtailed.

Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 740-41 (Utah 1982).
further

indicated

it

was

Gillmor's

appropriate

that

The Court

"preservation

of

suitable grazing lands" not be the primary consideration of the
partitioning court.

Id.. at 741.

Finally, the Court expressly

accepted the consequence that "the land as partitioned may be
less usable for grazing" and suggested that grazing be effected
by leases among the parties.

13.

It is in the context of these

remarks and the Court's ultimate affirmance of the judgment that
this court must consider the interveners' efforts under Rule
60(b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to be relieved from the
judgment.
Specifically,

intervenors

seek

access

over

the

parcels

awarded to plaintiff in order to graze stock on the eastern
portion of parcels awarded them.

In order to allow such access

this court would have to relieve the intervenors of the final
judgment in the partition action and amend the partition decree.
In addition to being presented with testimonial evidence,
the court inspected the premises, traversed in a four-wheel drive
vehicle the length of Sawmill Canyon Road, viewed each end of 35
Canyon and walked the length of Pine Canyon.

This evidence

persuaded the court that intervenors do not have traditional
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grazing

access to the eastern portions of their own parcels

unless

they

are

allowed

access

over

the

parcels

awarded

plaintiff.
35 Canyon is not accessible for grazing from the south.
Consequently,

access

over

interveners'

portions must be through Pine Canyon.

own

land

to

eastern

Stock in limited numbers

and in single file can be moved from the Sawmill Canyon Road
through Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area.

Moving the

stock back down Pine Canyon is even more limited, difficult and
treacherous.

Herding stock through Pine Canyon, then, does not

constitute traditional grazing access.

This is consistent with

the testimony of Richard Huffman in the second partition trial.
Mr.

Huffman

did

not

even

consider

Pine

Canyon

for access.

Additionally, earth moving equipment cannot create a stock trail
through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing access.

The evidence

did establish, however, that as many as 150 head of cattle can be
moved the length of the Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintiff's
parcels to the eastern portions of intervenors' parcels in less
than a full day.
Intervenors

have

presented

argument

suggesting

inconsistencies in the evidence and underlying Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment and Decree of Partition.
This court has considered each of these arguments but views the
alleged inconsistences as mere incongruities.

Suffice it to say
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that the record as a whole does not indicate an intent by the
court in the partition action to provide intervenors access over
plaintiff1s

awarded

parcels•

Furthermore,

the

transcript

indicates that the difficulty of access to the eastern portions
of the parcels was addressed in testimony before Judge Leary in
the partition trial.
This case presents a situation where the alleged mistake, if
any, could have and should have been corrected in the partition
trial.

Intervenors point to Exhibit 113-D7

action as the genesis of the mistake.

in the partition

This document, however,

was actually offered and sponsored by intervenor Charles Gillmor.
Furthermore, intervenor Edward Gillmor failed to review Exhibit
133-D and move to strike as he was expressly cautioned to do.
All parties had the opportunity to and did in fact elaborately
review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and Decree of Partition.
Under

such circumstances,

it would be inappropriate and

unwise to invoke the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(7) to grant
relief

from

the

final

judgment.

This

is a case where the

finality of the judgment should not be undermined over eight
years after its entry and six years after its affirmance in
response to assertions which suggest at the most "mistake,
'Exhibit 46-D in this action.

GILLMOR V, WRIGHT

PAGE FOURTEEN

inadvertence,
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excusable

neglect*w

60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
indicates the danger of undermining
should

not

litigating

provide

inspiration

the partition

case

Rule

This particular case

final judgments.

to these parties
ad

See,

infinitum.

Courts

to continue

Instead, these

parties should accept the decisions rendered, heed the admonition
of the Utah Supreme Court and effectuate traditional grazing
access "by leasing from one another."
Intervenors

suggest

that

657 P.2d at 741.

the

Judgment

and

Decree

of

Partition is no impediment to an order of this court granting an
easement by implication or necessity.

Such an order, however,

would violate traditional notions of finality inherent in the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

III.

CONCLUSION

Given these parties1 proclivity to invoke the jurisdiction
of

courts,

it

is

not

surprising

that,

as their

continuing

disputes age in the courts, the doctrines of the law of the case,
finality of judgments and res judicata come into play.

This case

and these disputes illustrate the fundamental wisdom inherent in
such doctrines.

The application of these doctrines in this case

leaves these parties as they were found and requires them to live
with the decisions of the courts whose jurisdiction they have so
freely invoked.

If the parties must resort to the courts to
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resolve their disputes, then they must adhere to and respect the
integrity of the decisions of those courts.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

court

determines

that

plaintiff's Complaint and interveners1 Counterclaims should be
dismissed, each party to bear its own costs.

Plaintiff should

prepare a draft of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
submit the same to defendants and intervenors for inclusion of
matters pertinent to the issues upon which they prevailed.

The

court fully realizes that certain of its factual resolutions in
this Summary Decision might provide fodder for appeal.

These

factual resolutions, however, do not dictate the result in this
court.

In the event a reviewing court chooses to reverse this

court's

judgment,

those

necessity of a new trial.

factual

resolutions

will

avert

the

The court expects to be presented with

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law approved as to form by
all parties.
For judicial economy and other obvious reasons, the court
intends to forward this Summary Decision to the presiding judge
and

suggest

that

he permanently

further proceedings

reassign

in the partition

this case and any

action

to Judge Murphy

pursuant to this court's inherent power.
Dated this

28th day

of November, 1988.

j^U
MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GILLMOR V. WRIGHT

PAGE SIXTEEN

SUMMARY DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this.

Summary

Decision,

postage

_day of November, 1988:

James B. Lee
John B. Wilson
Attorney for Plaintiffs
185 S. State, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
R. Stephen Marshall
Attorney for intervenor-defendant
Edward Leslie Gillmor
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney for Defendant Charles F. Gillmor
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

prepaid,

to

the

TabC

JAMES B. LEE (A1919)
JOHN B. WILSON (A3511)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as personal
representative of the estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT, RONA
R. WRIGHT,

Civil No. 9067

Defendants,
and

Judge Michael R. Murphy

CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,
Intervenor-Defendants.

* * * * * * * *

This matter came on for trial to the Court, Honorable
Michael R. Murphy presiding, on September 20 and 21, 1988.
matter

had

earlier

come

on

for

evidentiary

hearings

This

before

Honorable Judith M. Billings on plaintiff's motion for temporary
restraining order, September 30, 1986, and before Honorable Homer

Wilkinson

on

plaintiff's

September 25, 1987.

motion

for

preliminary

injunction,

Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor was present at

trial and represented by James B. Lee and John B. Wilson of
Parsons, Behle & Latimer.
and

represented

Defendant Dennis K. Wright was present

by D. Gilbert

Intervenor-defendant

Edward

Athay

Leslie

of

Athay

Gillmor

& Associates.

was

present

and

represented by R. Stephen Marshall of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy.

Intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor was present

and represented by D. Gilbert Athay of Athay & Associates.

The

Court observed and heard the testimony of the witnesses, reviewed
the exhibits submitted by the parties, and reviewed the trial
memoranda submitted by the parties.

The Court reviewed portions

designated by the parties of the transcripts of the hearings on
plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction and plaintiff's motion to amend
the judgment on her motion for preliminary injunction.

The Court

reviewed selected transcripts designated by the parties from the
trial of the "partition case", Edward Leslie Gillmor, et al.y v.
Florence Gillmor, et al. , Salt Lake County Third District Civil
No. 223998, as well as selected exhibits from the partition case
and the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on the appeal of the
same case, reported at 657 P.2d

736

(Utah 1982).

The Court

travelled in a vehicle the length of the Sawmill Canyon road from
the 1-80 frontage road to the property of Shirley Gillmor.
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The

Court continued in a vehicle to the southeast portion of the
Sawmill property owned by Shirley Gillmor*
length of Pine Canyon-

The Court walked the

The Court viewed each end of 35 Canyon.

The Court, being fully advised in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor, now hereby makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor is the owner of certain

real property located in Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
The south 112.0 acres of Section 21, the
south 112.0 acres of Section 22, the south
111.0 acres of that portion of Section 23
owned by Gillmors, the north 316.46 acres of
Section 26, the north 316.46 acres of Section
27, the north 316.54 acres of Section 28 less
the northeast quarter of the northeast
quarter, total net 276.46 acres, and the
southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of
Sections 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
Contains
1284.58 acres.
•

*

*

The north 528 acres of Section 21, the
north 528 acres of Section 22, the north 229
acres of that portion of Section 23 owned by
Gillmors, T4N, R5W, SLB&M.
Contains 1285
acres.
The property owned by Shirley Gillmor as described herein is the
northern one-half of a larger parcel of property commonly known
as the "Gillmor Sawmill Property".
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2.

Intervenor-defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor is the

owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
The south 323-54 acres of Section 26,
the south 323-54 acres of Section 27, the
south 323.54 acres of Section 28, the north
63 acres of the east half of Section 33, the
north 125-49 acres of Section 34 and the
north 125.51 acres of Section 35, T4N, R5E,
SLB&M. Contains 1284.62 acres.
3.

Intervenor-defendant

Charles

F. Gillmor

is the

owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
The south 257 acres of the east half of
Section 33 and the south 513.75 acres of
Section 34 and the south 514.50 acres of
Section 35, less .73 acre reserved to State
Road Commission of T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains
1284.50 acres.
4.

Defendants Dennis K. Wright, Sara C. Wright, David

L. Wright and Rona R. Wright are owners of certain real property
located in Sections 3 and 10, R5E, T3N, SLB&M, Summit County,
Utah.
5.

The Sawmill Canyon Road, as described by the Third

Judicial District Court of Summit County in the matter of Olsen
v. Papadopulos, begins at the frontage road to Interstate 80 in
Echo Canyon in Section 10, Range 5 East, Township 3 North, SLB&M,
and proceeds in a generally northerly direction crossing consecutively the property of the Wright defendants, Charles F. Gillmor,
Edward Leslie Gillmor and terminating on the property owned by
-4-

Shirley Gillmor at a point commonly known as "the forks" located
in Section 28, R5E, T4N, SLB&M.
drive vehicle

There is access by four-wheel

from the forks to the eastern portions of the

Gillmor Sawmill Property by dirt roads.
6.

The Sawmill Canyon Road is a single lane dirt road

located in the bottom of Sawmill Canyon,
7.

The Gillmor Sawmill Property was at one time owned

in common by Florence Gillmor, Edward Leslie Gillmor and Charles
Frank Gillmor.

It was partitioned by an order of the Third

Judicial District Court dated February
223998.

14, 1981 in Civil No.

The partition decision was affirmed on appeal by the

Utah Supreme Court in its opinion, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d
736 (Utah 1982).
8.

The

property

awarded

to

Florence

Gillmor

was

subsequently conveyed over time to Stephen T. Gillmor and/or his
wife, Shirley Gillmor.

Stephen T. Gillmor passed away in Febru-

ary, 1988 and, as of the trial of this action, the portion of the
Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor was owned by Shirley
Gillmor and Shirley Gillmor

has been substituted

for Stephen

Gillmor as the plaintiff.
9.

Between September,

194 3 and December, 1986, the

Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road, having been declared to be
such in 1943 by the decision of the Third Judicial District Court
of Summit County in the matter of Olsen v. Papadopulos.
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10.

The

Gillmor

family,

for

many

years

prior

to

December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon Road to obtain access to
their property for themselves, their employees and their guests
to

transport

and

tend

livestock,

to perform

maintenance

or

construct improvements on the property, and for big game hunting
by the family, employees and guests, but not including access for
persons holding permits from the landowners to hunt big game.
The road has historically carried a variety of vehicles including
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles,
and has been travelled by persons on foot and on horseback.
11.

During

the

years

1982

through

1986,

Stephen

Gillmor sold permits to allow persons to hunt big game on the
Gillmor Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor, and some of
those persons to whom permits were sold travelled in trucks to
the Florence Gillmor Sawmill Property on the Sawmill Canyon Road
and hunted big game there.
12.

At various times during the years 1982 through

1986, Stephen Gillmor was unable to transport hunters over the
Sawmill

Canyon Road because he was stopped

from doing so by

defendant Dennis Wright, who maintained that Stephen Gillmor did
not have the right to transport paying hunters across the Wright
property using the Sawmill Canyon Road.
13.

In 1986, Stephen Gillmor discovered the decision

in Olsen v. Papadopulos and presented it to Dennis Wright, who
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thereupon

temporarily

ceased

his

interference

with

Stephen

Gillmor's use of the road.
14.

On December 24, 1986, at the request of the Wright

defendants, the Summit County Commission formally abandoned the
Sawmill Canyon Road as a public road whereupon defendant Dennis
Wright

reiterated

the position of the Wright defendants that

Stephen Gillmor could no longer use the Sawmill Canyon Road to
transport paying hunters across the Wright property.
15.

From 1982 through 1986, Stephen Gillmor used the

Sawmill Canyon Road for access for his paying big game hunters,
and would have used the road for such purpose on more occasions,
but for the interference by Dennis Wright.
16.

The Gillmor Sawmill property has been designated

by Summit County as Agriculture-Grazing (AG-1) Zone.
17.

The sale of big game permits by Stephen Gillmor

and hunting pursuant to such permits, without a conditional use
permit having been issued, was not a lawful use of the Sawmill
Property during the years 1982 through 1986 because such activities violated the AG-1 zoning ordinance.
18.

While there was

some minimal

evidence of road

damage by hunters, there is realistically no difference in the
nature of the use of the road itself, whether the ultimate use of
the various parcels is for commercial hunting, grazing or both.
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19.

There was also some minimal evidence that hunters

are bothersome at times to ranchers, cattle and sheep, but there
was no sufficient showing that hunters' use of the road interfered with the abutting owners* use of or access to their land.
20.

Plaintiff suffered damages of $10,943 dollars in

revenues lost as a direct result of defendant Dennis Wright's
interference with Stephen Gillmor's use of the Sawmill Canyon
Road for access by hunters.
21.

Plaintiff and his agents, servants and hunters did

not trespass upon property belonging to Charles Gillmor or Edward
L. Gillmor.
22.

Plaintiff Stephen T. Gillmor and his agents and

hunters did not create a nuisance.
23.

Plaintiff was not unjustly enriched by the conduct

of hunting operations.
24.
case,

In its opinion on the appeal of the partition

the Utah

Supreme Court

ruled

that

historical

uses of

property are not sacrosanct and that Edward Gillmor's ranching
activities

would

be

affected

and curtailed

and

that

it was

appropriate that preservation of suitable grazing lands not be
the primary consideration of the partitioning court and that the
land as partitioned may be less useable for grazing.
25.

Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor do not have

traditional grazing access to eastern portions of their Sawmill

•8-

parcels unless they are allowed access

over

parcels

awarded

to

Florence Gillmor and now owned by Shirley Gillmor.
26.

Thirty-Five Canyon is not accessible for grazing

from the south.

Consequently, access over interveners' own land

to eastern portions must be through Pine Canyon.

Stock in

limited numbers and in single file can be moved from the Sawmill
Canyon Road through Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area.
Moving the stock back down Pine Canyon is even more limited,
difficult and treacherous.

Herding stock through Pine Canyon

then does not constitute traditional grazing access.

This is

consistent with the testimony of Richard Huffman in the second
partition trial.

Mr. Huffman did not even consider Pine Canyon

for access.
27.

Earthmoving equipment cannot create a stock trail

through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing access.

The evidence

did establish, however, that as many as 150 head of cattle can be
moved the length of Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintiff's parcels
to the eastern portions of intervenor's parcels in less than a
full day.
28.

The trial court in the partition action did not

intend to provide Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor access over
parcels awarded to Florence Gillmor.
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29.

The difficulty of access to the eastern portions

of the Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor parcels was addressed
in testimony in the partition case.
30.

The

source

of

the

"mistake"

in

the

partition

decision alleged by Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor is Exhibit
46-D (Exhibit 113D in the partition case).

Exhibit 46-D was

offered in the partition case by Charles Gillmor.

Edward Gillmor

failed to review Exhibit 46-D in the partition case and to move
to strike it as he was expressly cautioned by the Court to do.
31.

Under such circumstances, it would be inappropri-

ate and unwise to invoke the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(7)
to grant relief from the final judgment.

This is a case where

the finality of the judgment should not be undermined over eight
years after its entry and six years after its affirmance in
response

to assertions

which

suggest

at the mostf

"mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect".
32.

An order granting an easement by implication or

necessity would violate traditional notions of finality inherent
in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court
now hereby makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road until

its abandonment by Summit County on December 24, 1986, following
-10-

which the Sawmill Canyon Road was a private road.

Plaintiff, as

an abutting landowner, retained a right to use the road for any
purpose for which it was lawfully used prior to abandonment in
December, 1986.
2.

Plaintiff

Road for access
guests

for

is entitled

for herself, her

purposes

related

operation, for improvement

to use the Sawmill Canyon

family,

to

the

agents, servants and

conduct

of

her

ranching

or maintenance of the property, for

recreation and similar uses consistent with the use of the road
prior to December, 1986.
3.
Canyon

Road

Plaintiff

is

for access

by

not

entitled

paying

hunters

to

use

the

because

Sawmill

use of

the

Gillmor Sawmill Property for hunting by persons who had purchased
permits, without a conditional use permit having been issued, was
in violation of the AG-1 zoning ordinance and would, therefore,
not be a lawful use of the property.
4.

Defendants are not liable for interfering with the

use of the Sawmill Canyon Road by plaintiff for access by paying
hunters.
5.

Plaintiff

is

not

entitled

to

an

injunction

to

prevent interference by the Wright defendants with the use of the
Sawmill Canyon Road for access by paying hunters.
6.

Charles F. Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor are

not entitled to modify the Decree of Partition in the partition
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case, Civil No* 223998, to allow themselves access to their own
Sawmill

parcels

by

crossing

plaintiff's

parcel,

nor

are

intervenor-defendants entitled to an easement by implication or
necessity for such purpose.
1.

Plaintiff is not liable to intervenor-defendants

for trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment or accounting.
8.

Plaintiff's

complaint,

as

amended,

should

be

dismissed with prejudice,
9.

The counterclaims of the intervenor-defendants, as

amended, should be dismissed with prejudice.
10.

No costs are awarded.

ENTERED th

i. 17*.day

of _i

v ad,

I 989.

BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

*bluJ2

Dated:

JAMES B. LEE
JOHN B ^WILSON
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Dated:
D. GILBERT ATHAY
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Wright Defendants
and Charles F. Gillmor

R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Edward Leslie
Gillmor
219-.011989A
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I hereby certify that
prepaid,

4 true

and correct

I caused to be mailed, postage

copies of

the foregoing

BRIEF OF

APPELLANT SHIRLEY GILLMOR to each of the following on this
day of AjQy/fc/u-k.Cr , 1989:
RICHARD C. SKEEN
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
of and for
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for IntervenorDefendant-Respondent
Edward Leslie Gillmor
50 So. Main St., Ste. 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
D. GILBERT ATHAY
of and for
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Wright
Defendants-Respondents
and Intervenor-DefendantRespondent Charles F.
Gillmor
72 East 400 South
Suite 325
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

219:080489A
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